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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFERY LYNN CAMPBELL, 
Defendant and Appellant 
CaseNo.950324-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his jury convictions for possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1995); possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-2(a)(ii) (1995);1 possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1981); assault, a class B 
1
 Through apparent administrative oversight, Counts One and Two in the Information 
erroneously cited subsection (ii), under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1 )(a), instead of subsection 
(iv). This error was not repeated injury instructions (R. 54-57), and the jury convicted Appellant 
of "Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine as charged 
in Count I of the Information", and of "Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, a lesser 
included offense within that charged in Count II of the Information" (R. 66,67); SSS. Utah Code 
Ann. §§58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(2)(a)(l). Appellant's failure to challenge the Information 
at trial waived any appellate issue. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) and (d). Appellant was on 
adequate notice of the offenses in any event Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b); sg£ State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 
1208,1213-15 (Utah 1985), esUAsmssL 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 
262 (Utah 1985), cert.denied. 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§76-5-102(1) and 77-36-1 (1995); and 
unlawful detention, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code. Ann. §§76-5-304 
and 77-36-1 (1973; 1995) (R. 66-68). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence of prior bad acts admissible under rules 404(b) and 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence? If not, was admission of the evidence prejudicial error? 
2. Was trial defense counsel ineffective? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,935-39 (Utah 1994), the supreme court began to 
refine its articulation of the standards for reviewing trial court rulings. The trial court has 
"a good deal of discretion" to admit evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Pena. 
869 P.2d at 938 ("[o]ther rulings on the admission of evidence entail a good deal of 
discretion") (dicta). See also State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983); United 
States v.Patterson. 20 F.3d 809, 813 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 128 (1994). The 
appellate courts accord trial courts considerable freedom to admit or exclude evidence 
under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Esna, 689 P.2d at 937-38 (dicta). See also State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,239-40 (Utah 1992). This Court will reverse an evidentiary 
ruling under rule 403 only if the trial court's decision was "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991); Hamilton. 827 P.2d 
2 
232,240 (Utah 1992). If the Court determines the evidence was inadmissible under rule 
404(b) or rule 403, then it must determine whether admission was prejudicial error. State 
v. O'NeiL 848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App. 1993); see also State v, Qlsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 
1010 (Utah App. 1994). Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction 
only where this Court concludes there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 699 (quoting Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 
240 (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989))). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(a): 
Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion. 
Utah R. Evid 404(b): 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an Information with Count One, Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) with Intent to Distribute, a second degree 
3 
felony; Count Two, Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana) with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony; Count Three, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor; Count Four, Assault, a class B misdemeanor; and Count Five, 
Unlawful Detention, a class B misdemeanor. 
In a one-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute (Count One), possession of drug 
paraphernalia (Count Three), assault (Count Four), and unlawful detention (Count Five). 
Under Count Two, defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana). 
Defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on Count One; 
to concurrent terms of six months in the Washington County Jail on Counts Two through 
Four; and to consecutive terms of six months in the Washington County Jail on Counts 
Four and Five. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background. The incidents giving rise to all charges occurred on October 25, 
1995. Prior to that date, defendant and Teri LaConti had been boyfriend and girlfriend for 
about a year and a half (R. 245,285,399). Their relationship was stormy. They had been 
living together in Ogden, Utah, until Teri called a girlfriend to drive her back to St. 
George, Utah (R. 401). Later, after defendant spoke with her, defendant went to St. 
George and picked her up (R. 401). 
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During the week prior to October 25,1994, the two lived out of a car, and then 
stayed at a motel for a couple of nights (R. 246-47,399-400). During that week, Ten saw 
defendant use illegal drugs (R. 255). A couple of days before the incidents, Teri herself 
used methamphetamine which defendant provided (R. 283-84,312). 
Possessipn 9f Metfomph<tomin<? with Intent to Distribute, Possession <?f 
Maqjuana. Possession of Paraphernalia. On October 25,1994, defendant told Teri he 
was going to sell drugs (marijuana and "speed") to a friend named Mary Ann (R. 257-59). 
Later, defendant left the motel room and returned with the drugs (R. 286, 315). Teri 
observed defendant weigh methamphetamine ("speed") on a set of scales, and put it in 
"bindles" to sell (R. 255-56,259,315). She also saw defendant writing in a little black 
notebook while he was "weighing out his stuff' (R. 279-80). Defendant put the baggies 
of marijuana and "bindles" of methamphetamine in his pockets, and that is where Teri 
last saw them (R. 438). 
When defendant was arrested, the arresting officer seized a set of scales (State's 
Ex. 9), "bindles" of methamphetamine (State's Exs. 6-7), and two baggies of marijuana 
(State's Exs. 1-2) from under the driver's seat of the car defendant was driving (R. 362-
68,372-73; R. 323-330,336; 345-46). A small black notebook (State's Ex. 3), identified 
by the arresting officer as an "owe sheet" (defendant's "books to keep track of money 
owed and money paid") was seized from defendant's back pants pocket, and contained 
the name "Mary Ann" (R. 368,371). 
5 
At trial, Teri identified the seized items, i.e., the scales, the bindles, and the 
baggies of marijuana, as those defendant had used or prepared in the motel room (R. 259 
264,274-75). Teri also identified the little black book as defendant's record "[o]f what 
people owe him for his dope"(R. 278-80). 
Unlawful Detention, Assault, While they were at the motel on the day of the 
incident, Teri testified defendant "was acting really weird" (R. 248-49). Among other 
things, he told her, "After today, you'll feel no more pain. You stay with me just one 
more day" (R. 257). She attributed defendant's behavior to his use of drugs (R. 256). 
She had observed drugs affect defendant's behavior on prior occasions, and that is why 
she was "scared for [her] life" (R. 256-57,248-49,285,317). Although defendant left 
their motel room twice, Teri did not feel free to walk away from the motel, so she told 
him she wanted to go to Albertson's on the way to Mary Ann's to get some aspirin for a 
toothache. She did not have a toothache (R. 251,264,286), but wanted to get around 
people so she could get away from defendant or call someone because she felt "he was 
going to hurt [her]" (R. 250-51). 
After they drove to Albertson's, Teri said to defendant, "I'll go in" (R. 264). 
Defendant refused, and went with her, holding her arm "real tight" (R. 265). When they 
got inside the store, Teri "tried to get away. I tried to get him off me, to let me - make 
his arm go off me. And he wouldn't. The more I fought, the tighter he would grab me 
and pull me into him" (R. 266). Teri was 5f 4M tall and weighed 100-115 pounds, and 
6 
defendant was a "tall man" (R. 202) who weighed between 160 and 170 pounds (R. 312). 
Somehow, Teri got free and ran to a phone at the courtesy stand where she tried to call a 
girlfriend; however, her friend was not home, and defendant hung up the phone and 
dragged her out of the store (R. 267-68,299-300). Teri yelled, "Leave me alone. I don't 
want to go with you" (R. 268,297). Although Teri was trying to draw attention to herself 
and people were looking at them, nobody responded (R. 293-94,301). When they got 
back to the car, Teri screamed (R. 268). When defendant shoved her in the car several 
times and went around to the driver's side, Teri got out of the car (R. 269). Defendant 
"was just freaky," and tried to break the handle off her door. I& 
Mr. and Mrs. Young were just getting out of their car when they heard Teri 
scream, "Leave me alone"(R. 201-202,227). They saw her struggling with a man who 
was trying to push her into a car (R. 202-208,228). Mrs. Young saw Teri break free and 
run to the front of the store, so she ran toward her to see if Teri was okay (R. 208-09). 
When Mrs. Young asked what she could do, Teri said, "Call 911" (R. 210). Mr. Young 
did, and Teri ran into the store (R. 211,228). 
Jeremy Gabrielson was bagging groceries a few feet from the courtesy booth when 
Teri "ran into the store. And she seemed like she was hysterical. And she asked me to 
call 911 for her. And she said her boyfriend had attacked her and tried to kidnap her. So 
I called 911. After the operator came on, I gave the phone to her " (R 240). 
7 
Ten told the 911 dispatcher her name and defendant's name, and explained that he 
was trying to kill her, that he had drugs, and that she needed help (R. 271). She also 
described defendant's car (R. 276). 
Officer Michael Applegate identified the car described by the 911 dispatcher as 
having left the scene of a domestic dispute at Albertson's. Officer Applegate pulled it 
over, searched it, and found the drugs and paraphernalia already described, and arrested 
defendant who was the car's driver and sole occupant (R. 358-73). 
At trial, Teri identified two photos (State's Ex. 13) showing bruises on her arms 
taken in the Albertson's parking lot the day of the incident (R. 280-81). She testified that 
the bruises were caused by defendant holding her so tight. Id. 
Defendant's testimony. Defendant's testimony differed substantially from the 
State's evidence. He denied knowing of drugs in his motel room (R. 404). He testified 
that, on the day of the incident, Teri "was just real scared or just paranoid or something," 
and he thought she was having a nervous breakdown or, "she had done quite a bit of her 
drugs." Li! 
2
 When Mrs. Young entered the store, Teri was on the telephone and asked Mrs. 
Young to wait outside and to get her when the police arrived (R. 212). Although Teri 
appeared frightened, Mrs. Young did not suspect that she was under the influence of 
either alcohol or drugs (R. 213-15). Officer Garen Brecke, who responded to Albertson's 
and interviewed Teri and other witnesses, testified that, although Teri was initially 
"hysterical" and "very nervous," he was able to calm her down and take her statement (R. 
184, 193-96). In Officer Brecke's opinion, Teri was not under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs (R. 197-98). He attributed her earlier agitated behavior as consistent with the 
events she and other witnesses had described (R. 199). 
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Defendant testified they walked in Albertson's "pretty much - let's see - 1 do 
believe it was hand-in-hand" (R. 405). Defendant testified that he did not touch her when 
they left the store until after she got out of the car, so he put his arms around her waist to 
comfort her, leaned against the car, and talked to her, asking if she wanted to go to the 
hospital "because she was just going off for no reason" (R. 406,416-17). When she said, 
"Get away from me," he let her go, got in the car, and drove away. LL 
Although he had had the car he was driving from the owners for a month, 
defendant testified that some of the items still in the car belonged to the owners (R. 411).3 
Defendant also denied knowing the drugs were under his seat, or that he arranged to 
provide drugs to Mary Ann (R. 422,423-24). He specifically denied that the drugs found 
in the car belonged to him. I& 
Although he testified to seeing "bindles" in his past, defendant denied ever seeing 
the "bindles" introduced in his case. Id* (State's Exs. 6-7). Defendant also denied being 
familiar with the scales (R. 417-18; State's Ex. 9), and testified that the black book was 
Teri's which she brought back from California (R. 418; State's Ex. 3). According to 
defendant, "she stated that her dad let her have it or something like that. And so she sort 
of gave it to me, and so we both used it and left it in the car." LLi Defendant denied 
3
 Teri testified on rebuttal that the items in the car belonged only to defendant or 
herself (R. 437). 
4
 As noted above, Officer Applegate testified he found the book in defendant's 
back pocket (R. 368). 
9 
being aware at the time that Teri had used methamphetamine a couple of days before the 
incident, and denied that he had provided it to her, although he testified her actions were 
consistent with previous occasions when she had used the drug (R. 421,419). 
Defendant denied making any threatening statements to Teri on the day of the 
incident, and specifically denied telling her, "After today, you won't feel any more pain" 
(R. 414-15). He denied knowing what "set her off' at Albertson's (R. 415). He denied 
assaulting her at Albertson's (R. 416). He testified he did not recall ever restraining her 
against her will (R. 417). 
Defendant denied causing Teri's bruises, and testified that he didn't know how to 
account for them: "She's had bruises appear for no reason. We wouldn't know how, and 
~ and I couldn't say" (R. 420). Defendant denied trying to force Teri into the car (R. 
421). He testified that he didn't do anything to lead anyone to think he was struggling 
with her, and that the Youngs may have "misinterpreted me as - or it as a struggle" (R. 
424). 
Challenged Rule 404fb) Rebuttal Testimony. To rebut defendant's testimony 
denying his assault or unlawful detention of Teri, the State called defendant's ex-wife, 
Jan Brown. Following is part of her contested testimony:5 
A. I was being harassed [by defendant] by the phone, by drive-bys, physically. 
So I didn't -
5
 Her entire testimony, the parties' discussion, and the trial court's ruling are in the 
Addendum. 
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THE COURT: When you say "physically," ma'am, what do you mean? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I was dragged by the car. I was thrown through doors. 
MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I -
THE WITNESS: I was choked. 
MR. TERRY: I object under 404, and I ask to be heard outside the presence of the 
jury. 
(R. 430). Trial counsel then argued that Ms. Brown's testimony of prior bad acts was 
specifically prohibited since it did not fall within any of the exceptions under rule 404(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 431-32). 
Trial Court's Ruling and Rationale. The trial court agreed that Ms. Brown's 
testimony would not be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
or knowledge. However the trial court ruled that it was admissible to establish absence of 
mistake or accident (R. 432). The judge concluded by stating, 
when it was pointed out on his cross-examination by Mr. Rowe to 
[defendant] that there were bruises shown in the photographs that were 
taken immediately after ilie incident at Albertson's, [defendant] expressed 
lack of knowledge; expressed the appearance of unknown bruises on [the 
victim]. That, to me, requires — almost demands of the State to present 
evidence if it has any regarding absence of mistake or accident. 
Id* After hearing Ms. Brown's proffered testimony, the trial court permitted the 
following additional testimony before the jury: 
A. The number of times [of physical contact between herself and 
defendant] is pretty hard to count. It was often. There were several — 
several that were worse than others. 
11 
I have been thrown through doors. Which people on other occasions 
have seen the broken doors out on my patio. I still don't have the doors on 
my house, to this day. I've been dragged by the car. I have been choked. 
Things have been broken in my house. Bookcases knocked over. On and 
on. It was constant. 
(R. 435-36). 
Defendant elected not to cross-examine Ms. Brown (R. 436). The State made no 
mention of her testimony in closing argument (R. 444-51,462-64). There was no limiting 
instruction as to her testimony, although trial counsel did not object to the proposed 
instructions, (R. 442), or to the instructions as given, (R. 443,464-65), nor did he request 
additional instructions. I$L6 
Other facts necessary to the disposition of this case are set forth in argument 
below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Prior Bad Acts - Rules 404 and 403. Evidence defendant assaulted his ex-
wife was not offered to prove defendant's bad character or criminal disposition and was 
not offered in the State's case-in-chief. It was properly admissible, in rebuttal to 
defendant's own testimony related to Counts Four (assault) and Five (unlawful detention), 
as proof of identity, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, and intent. Utah R. Evid 
404(b). 
6
 See note 9 below. 
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Rule 403 provides only that certain evidence "may be excluded." Utah R. Evid. 
403. Exclusion rests within the substantial discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling must 
stand so long as it lies within the "limits of reasonability." The trial court's ruling 
admitting the evidence was not an abuse of discretion since the evidence directly rebutted 
what was defendant's only defense to the assault and unlawful detention counts: that he 
was not the perpetrator and did not know who or what caused the injuries. The probative 
value of this evidence was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Indeed, since he 
opened the door to its admission, defendant himself provided its probative value. 
Even if it were error, under either rule 404 or 403, to admit evidence of 
defendant's prior assaults on his ex-wife, it was not prejudicial. The corroborated 
testimony of the victim and photographic evidence of her injuries were already before the 
jury on the assault and unlawful detention counts. The State's evidence was clearly 
sufficient. Defendant's testimony was implausible. Even absent the contested evidence, 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a different result 
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ("Andfirs" Submission). Defendant's 
counsel has submitted the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as "frivolous" and 
has certified that he served a copy of the brief on defendant. Sfifi Anders v. California. 87 
S.Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 1968 (Utah 1981). Def. Br. at 15-16. 
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However, defendant's counsel has made no motion to withdraw, and has failed to brief 
the issue or issues defendant wanted to raise as required. Sss. Anders. 87 S.Ct. at 1400; 
Clavton. 639 P.2d at 169-71: Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 874-75, 877-79 (Utah 1990). 
This Court should direct defendant's counsel to supplement his brief so it complies with 
Andsrs and its progeny. The State elects not to address ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel until defendant's counsel has briefed this issue. See Clayton. 639 P.2d at 170. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT ASSAULTED HIS EX-WIFE 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED TO REBUT 
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS THAT HE WAS NOT THE 
PERPETRATOR AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT 
CAUSED THE VICTIM'S INJURIES 
1. Prior Bad Acts - Utah R Evid. 404(b). 
The Utah appellate courts, as well as the federal courts, "interpret Rule 404(b) as 
an 'inclusionary' rule." State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State 
v. Tavlor. 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991)). 
Thus, Rule 404 allows prior bad act evidence in a criminal trial 
where it is offered to show any element of the alleged crime. Prior bad act 
evidence is only excluded were the sole reason it is being offered it to prove 
bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that 
character. 
O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 700. In other words, if the prior bad act evidence is offered to show 
an element or material fact, and not solely criminal propensity, it is admissible. Further, 
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when evidence establishes elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused '"it is 
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes.'" 
Tavlor, 818 P.2d. at 569 (quoting State v. Jamison 767 P.2d 134,137 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Utah appellate courts have often admitted evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
pursuant to rule 404(b). O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 700 (citing, e.g., State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 
291,296 (Utah 1988) (admitting evidence of sexual assault to show intent and mental 
state on kidnaping charge); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,1075 (Utah 1987) (admitting 
evidence of prior forgery conviction to show identity); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572 (admitting 
evidence of prior drug conviction to show possession and common plan of distribution); 
State v. MorrelL 803 P.2d 292,296 (Utah App. 1990) (admitting evidence of prior 
robbery to show intent for later robbery)). 
When defendant denied being the perpetrator of the victim's injuries and denied 
knowing how she sustained the bruises on her arms, he raised identity, accident, 
knowledge, and intent as issues. £fi£ State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922,926 (Utah App. 
1994) (manslaughter defendant placed identity, intent, and lack of accident or mistake in 
issue when defendant denied being the perpetrator of the victim's injuries, and argued that 
the injuries might have been caused by accident). The evidence of defendant's intentional 
assaults on his ex-wife properly rebutted his testimony that he caringly held the victim in 
his arms while asking her if she wanted to go to the hospital, and that he was ignorant of 
how the victim's arms may have been bruised. Ms. Brown's brief rebuttal testimony 
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about defendant's violent behavior demonstrated that it was more likely that defendant 
was the cause of the victim's injuries, that they were no accident or physiological 
anomaly, that he had knowledge of how they were caused, and that defendant intended to 
cause them in spite of his testimony to the contrary. 
a. Identity 
Mr. and Mrs. Young testified they saw a man they could not identify struggling to 
push the victim into a car in the Albertson's parking lot (R. 202-207,212; 226-29). The 
victim identified defendant as her attacker (R. 265-70). But defendant attacked the 
victim's credibility, asserting that she was on drugs at the time (R. 404). 
Defendant further testified he did not do anything to lead anyone to think he was 
struggling with the victim in the parking lot, and that a witness may have 
"misinterpreted" seeing a "struggle"(R. 424). Defendant also denied causing the bruises 
on the victim's arms, and testified he didn't know what caused them (R. 420). 
By so doing, defendant raised the issue of identity: he professed he was not the 
one who caused the victim's injuries. Testimony by his former wife regarding his 
assaults on her rebutted and undermined defendant's assertion since he had intentionally 
injured her in the past (R. 430,435; S££ State v. Rocco- 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1990)). 
Since defendant opened the door to this evidence in his case-in-chief, he cannot 
now be heard to complain that the State presented it in rebuttal. Indeed, before its case-
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in-chief, the State put defendant on notice that his ex-wife "may be called in rebuttal or if 
necessary" (R. 124-25). 
In State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah App. 1994), the defendant argued that the 
trial court erred in admitting into evidence a mug shot photograph. He claimed that the 
photograph was not admissible because it brought to the jury's attention evidence of his 
prior criminal activity, which is generally inadmissible under rule 404(a). The State 
responded that the photograph was properly admitted under rule 404(b) because it proved 
identity and because it was admitted only after defendant elicited testimony regarding its 
existence. This Court agreed that a defendant cannot on appeal attack the admission of 
evidence when "he himself opened the door to its introduction on cross-examination."7 
882 P.2d at 154 (citing State v. Barney. 681 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Utah 1984)). Accord State 
v. Pacheco. 778 P.2d 26,30 (Utah App. 1989) (acknowledging "the admission of 
improper photographs has been held to not constitute reversible error where defendants 
opened the door for admission"). 
As this Court wrote in Ramos, 
Normally, we would further consider whether it was admissible after the 
balancing required under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
However, because we conclude that defendant elicited the introduction of 
the photograph and cannot therefore challenge its admission on appeal, we 
7
 Trial defense counsel in Ramos elicited testimony from a State's witness that 
led to introduction of the photograph. In this case, defendant's own testimony opened the 
door to the prior bad acts evidence. 
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do not undertake a Rule 403 analysis and do not consider whether the 
photograph was unduly prejudicial 
848P.2dn.2atl55. 
Federal case law similarly prohibits a defendant from challenging the admission of 
prior bad acts evidence when he or she was responsible for its introduction. For example, 
in United States v. Guinn. 454 F.2d 29,37 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 407 U.S. 911,92 S. Ct 
2437 (1972), identification was at issue, and the defendant cross-examined a witness 
about the use of photographs for identification. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded: 
Although, under certain circumstances, admission of suggestive 
photographs tending to allude to a criminal record or bad character, might 
well result in reversible error, this is not such a case. Here, the admission of 
the photographs will not result in reversal because the door for the 
admission was opened by the defendants It was proper for the 
government then, on redirect, to introduce the photographs to clear up the 
doubt as to the identification. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
b. Acgidfflt Qt qiisfckg 
Defendant raised accident or mistake when he had no explanation for the bruises 
on the victim's arms, and testified that she had suffered unexplained bruises in the past, 
implying that the cause of the injuries was accidental or some sort of physiological 
anomaly (R. 420). Testimony by defendant's former wife that he frequently and 
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intentionally caused her physical injury was properly admitted as fair rebuttal to 
defendant's implicit claims of accident and mistake (R. 430,435). 
"Evidence which shows that an event was not caused by accident tends to show 
that the event was caused intentionally." Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926 (quoting People v. 
Brown. 199 Ill.App.2d 860,145 IlLDec. 841, 851, 557 N.E.2d 611,621, appeal denied. 
133 I11.2d 561,149 IlLDec. 326, 561 N.E.2d 696 (1990)). "By maintaining an accident 
defense, defendant also placed intent in issue." Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926. 
c. Knowledge and intent 
The State presented photographic and testimonial evidence related to bruises on 
the victim's arms (State's Ex. 13; R. 280-81). Defendant raised knowledge and intent as 
an issue in his defense when he testified he put his arms around the victim's waist to 
comfort her, leaned against the car, and talked to her, asking if she wanted to go to the 
hospital, and when he denied knowing how the bruises on the victim's arms were caused, 
and specifically denied that he had caused them (R. 406,420). The testimony of 
defendant's former wife properly rebutted defendant's professed ignorance of the cause 
of the victim's injuries (R. 430,435). 
In State v. Brown. 577 P.2d 135,136 (Utah 1978), the supreme court held that 
"[i]n testifying that he was innocently involved," the defendant "directly put in issue his 
own knowledge and intent" Thus evidence of an alleged prior, unrelated offense 
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involving similar criminal activity by the defendant was properly admitted as evidence of 
defendant's knowledge and intent. 
As this Court noted in O'NeiL the federal case of United States v. Martino. 759 
F.2d 998 (2nd Cir. 1985) is also instructive:8 
In Martino- the defendant was arrested at the site of an illegal drug sale. He 
claimed that although he knew another participant, it was a coincidence he 
was at the site of the transaction. In effect, he asserted a "mere presence" 
defense in an attempt to raise doubts about the elements of knowledge and 
intent required for conviction. The trial court allowed into evidence a 
juvenile drug conviction from eleven years earlier as "similar act evidence 
bearing on the issues of [defendant's] knowledge and intent." I$L at 1002. 
Affirming the trial court's ruling, the Second Circuit held the defendant "by 
his defense, placed in issue the question of knowledge and intent as to his 
association" with the other drug sale participants. IJL at 1005. "Thus, the 
government in an effort to meet its burden of proof was certainly entitled to 
offer this prior similar act evidence to aid the jury in assessing [defendant's] 
intentions." Id* See also State v. MorrelL 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990) 
(finding evidence of prior robbery admissible to infer intent). 
Q3l£il,848P.2dat700. 
2. Prior Bad Acts - Rule 403. As noted above, since defendant himself opened 
the door to introduction of the prior bad act testimony, this Court need not apply a rule 
403 balancing test. $££ Ramos, 848 P.2d n.2 at 155. In other words, defendant himself 
gave the evidence probative value by his own defense, and cannot now claim unfair 
prejudice. 
8
 "Utah courts look 'to the interpretations of the federal rules [of evidence] by the 
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah Rules/ State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 
1333-34 (Utah 1986)." O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 700. 
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Assuming this Court disagrees that defendant opened the door and chooses to 
apply the probative value versus unfair prejudice balancing test, the trial court's ruling 
whether to exclude evidence under rule 403 is subject to substantial appellate deference 
and must stand so long as it lies within the "limits of reasonability." 
The trial court acted well within the limits of reasonability by allowing evidence of 
defendant's prior bad acts. The charged offense of assault and the prior assaults were 
similar (defendant threw his ex-wife through doors; he tried to force the victim in this 
case through a car door). Sfifi Teuscher. 883 P.2d at 926-28 (prior assaults against other 
victims admissible). The interval between the offenses was short (defendant was 
divorced by his former wife in December 1992, and committed the offense of assault in 
this case in October 1994. Sfifi O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 701 (incidents three years apart 
admissible). Although the State had other evidence of identity, absence of mistake or 
accident, and knowledge and intent from other witnesses, that is not a bar to the 
admissibility of this rebuttal testimony. £fi£ State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,296 (Utah 
1988) (other bad acts evidence admissible even where prosecution presented other 
evidence of defendant's intent). Finally, there is no basis to assume that the jury was any 
more prejudiced against defendant based on Ms. Brown's brief testimony regarding 
defendant's prior aggressive behavior than from the testimony of the State's witnesses 
about the charged offenses. Indeed, their testimony occupies nearly 200 pages of 
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typewritten transcript while Ms. Brown's entire contested testimony occupies less than 20 
lines. 
3. Prior Bad Acts - No Prejudicial Error. "Improperly admitted evidence 
requires reversal of a conviction only where we conclude there is a 'reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" O'NeiL 848 P.2d at 699 (quoting 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,140 (Utah 1992), cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993)). Even assuming this Court found any error under rules 404 or 403, it was not 
prejudicial since it was not outcome-determinative. The State's evidence was clearly 
sufficient. The corroborated testimony of the victim and photographic evidence of her 
injuries were already before the jury on Counts Four and Five. Even absent the contested 
evidence, the jury would still have convicted defendant on these two counts. There was 
no "reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result absent the admission of the prior bad 
acts evidence." State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424,431 (Utah 1988).9 
POINT II 
COUNSEL'S PARTIAL ANDERS SUBMISSION 
WARRANTS NO FURTHER RESPONSE 
Defendant's counsel has submitted the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
"frivolous" and has certified that he served a copy of the brief on defendant. £fi£ Anders 
9
 Although there was no limiting instruction, a failure to give a cautionary 
instruction, particularly where trial counsel fails to object or request additional 
instructions, does not constitute prejudicial error. £fi£ State v. Smith- 700 P.2d 1106 
(Utah 1985). 
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v. California. 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 1968 (Utah 1981). Def. 
Br. at 15-16. However, defendant's counsel has made no motion to withdraw and, other 
than asserting that he "cannot, in good faith, present an argument on the issue.. . which 
would not be frivolous" (Def. Br. at 15), has failed to brief the issue or issues defendant 
wanted to raise as case law requires. Sfifi Anders. 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Clayton. 639 P.2d at 
169-71; Dunn v.Cook. 791 P.2d 873,874-75, 877-79 (Utah 1990). This Court should 
direct defendant's counsel to supplement his brief so it complies with Anders, Clayton, 
and Dunn. The State elects not to address ineffective assistance of trial counsel until 
defendant's counsel has briefed this issue. See Clayton. 639 P.2d at 170. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State respectfully requests oral argument to answer any questions or concerns 
the Court may have. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 Kf day of July, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
314 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Isn 
No, 
And 
't that why she was afraid of you? 
it's not. 
isn't 
the vehicle, and you 1 
vehicle, because you < 
A. 
step down. 
No, 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
that why she attempted to get out of 
would not let her get out of the 
wanted to control her? 
it's not. 
ROWE: 
COURT: 
TERRY: 
COURT: 
Z have no further questions. 
Anything else, Mr. Terry? 
No, Your Honor. 
All right. Thank you, sir. You may 
Do you have any other witnesses, Counsel? 
MR. 
THE 
TERRY: 
COURT: 
rested, any rebuttal, 
MR. 
to the stand. 
to come in 
Counsel? 
the others 
THE 
• 
She 
MR. 
ROWE: 
COURT: 
No, Your Honor. 
All right. The defendant having 
Mr. Rowe? 
Yes. I'd like to call Jan Campbell 
All right. Let's ask Jan Campbell 
has not been sworn; is that correct, 
ROWE: 
were sworn 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
ROWE: 
She has not. She was not here when 
. i 
All right. 
She has been out in the lobby. 
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MR. TERRY: May counsel approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Certainly, gentlemen. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel at the bench out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was not recorded.) 
THE COURT: Janet Campbell, would you come in 
front of these tables, face the clerk and raise your right 
hand and be sworn. That's fine right there, ma'am. 
Thank you. Go ahead. 
JAM BROWN, 
the witness herein, having been 
first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. Would you have a 
seat here. 
Go ahead. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROWE: 
Q. Would you state your name and where you live. 
&. Jan Brown. St. George. 
THE COURT: Used to be Campbell, ma'am? 
THE WITNESS: Used to be Campbell. 
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THE COURT: All right. We have misnamed you. 
I'm sorry. 
Go ahead, Counsel. 
Q. BY MR. ROWE: And are you acquainted with 
Jeffery Campbell? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how are you acquainted with Mr. Campbell? 
A* I was married to him until December of '92. 
Q. And both — during the period of your marriage 
and since that time, are you -- have you maintained contact 
with Mr. Campbell? Have you known him and his whereabouts 
and friends and mutual acquaintances? 
A. We have had contact several times since the 
divorce. 
Q. And with regard to Mr. Campbell's dealings with 
yourself and other women that he has had relationships, are 
you familiar in any respect with those types of 
relationships? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you aware of any reputation Mr. Campbell may 
have with regard to his dealings with women that he has 
close personal relationships with? 
MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I object as to 
relevance. And also I think we're getting into — 
MR. ROWE: Your Honor, he placed his credibility 
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in issue when he took the stand, and he's made 
representations as to his nonviolent nature. 
THE COURT: Well, I didn't hear any reputation 
testimony, Counsel. 
MR. TERRY; That's correct, Your Honor. We're 
getting into the 404 evidence that I don't believe is 
appropriate. 
THE COURT: Hang on just a second and let me get 
the right rule in front of me. 
Counsel, I am not going to allow this testimony 
to come in as character testimony. But I call your 
attention to Rule 404 Sub (b) if you have specific 
instances with respect to this witness. 
MR. ROWE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll limit it 
to that, then. 
Q. Miss Campbell, during the course of your 
relationship with Mr. Campbell, were there occasions when 
he ~ Mr. Campbell and yourself had disagreements between 
each other in the course of your marriage? 
A* Yes, sir. 
Q. During that period of time, did you feel it 
incumbent upon yourself to take action in order to protect 
yourself from Mr. Campbell in the form of seeking 
protective orders and things like that? 
MR. TERRY: Your Honor, objection. Relevance 
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and ~ 
THE COURT: The action she took, Counsel, is not 
relevant. Sustained. Focus on the events that caused the 
problems, and what happened between the two of them. 
Q. BY MR. ROWE: Well, did you seek help during the 
course of your marriage because of your relationship with 
Mr. Campbell? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what was the nature of the instances and — 
which you felt you needed assistance outside in your 
marriage to deal with Mr. Campbell? 
A. I was being harassed by the phone, by drive-bys, 
physically. So I didn't ~ 
THE COURT: When you say "physically," ma'am, 
what do you mean? 
THE WITNESS: Physically. 
THE COURT: What did Mr. Campbell do that you 
characterize as physical? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I was dragged by the car. I 
was thrown through doors. 
MR. TERRY: Your Honor, I ~ 
THE WITNESS: I was choked. 
MR. TERRY: I object under 404, and I ask to be 
heard outside the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: Members of the Jury, I'm going to 
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excuse you briefly* As you leave the courtroom, remember, 
don't discuss the case among yourselves or form or express 
any opinion. Don't get too comfortable in the jury room, 
because you're going to be back in a hurry. 
(Whereupon, a discussion was had among Court 
and counsel in open court out of the hearing of 
the jury, which was recorded as follows:) 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bailiff. 
The record should reflect the jury has departed, 
and the door is shut. 
Your objection to 404, Mr. Terry? 
MR. TERRY: It's under 404(b), Your Honor. I 
submit that this evidence — I mean this has been a clean 
trial up to now. But I submit that this evidence is being 
introduced specifically for the purpose of showing -- of 
bringing in bad acts ~ alleged bad acts to prove my ~ my 
client's character in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith, which is specifically prohibited by 
404(b). 
I don't think that the State can put on this 
evidence under the exceptions of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake or accident with this witness. They may have been 
able to do that with Teri LaCorti, Your Honor, but I submit 
to the Court that this witness bringing in these alleged 
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bad acts from a previous relationship do not fall in any of 
those exceptions and only prejudice this jury. 
THE COURT: Counsel, motive, maybe• Opportunity 
and intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, I agree with 
you. Identity, I agree with you. But when it was pointed 
out on his cross-examination by Mr. Rowe to Mr. Campbell 
that there were bruises shown in the photographs that were 
taken immediately after the incident in Albertson's, 
Mr. Campbell expressed lack of knowledge; expressed the 
appearance of unknown bruises on Miss LaCorti. That, to 
me, requires — almost demands of the State to present 
evidence if it has any regarding absence of mistake or 
accident. 
MR. TERRY: And I think that they could do that 
with her or with some physician, but not his ex-wife. 
THE COURT: I think to the contrary, Counsel. 
Ma'am, were you giving us a laundry list of 
occurrences of physical violence between yourself and 
Mr. Campbell during the course of your marriage? 
Let me ask you specifically tell us that again 
on the record before the jury comes back in so I'll know 
what your full testimony will be with regard to instances 
of physical violence — Mr. Campbell against yourself — 
during the course of your marriage or your separation or 
divorce. And if it's something that's after the separation 
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or divorce, please note ~ give me an idea of what that 
is. 
THE WITNESS: After we were divorced, there was 
the harassment. It wasn't exactly physical, it was the 
telephone. And I did file separate charges on that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
THE WITNESS: And driving by and that kind of 
thing. 
THE COURT: Forget about the telephone, then. 
Let's talk about physical occurrences between yourself and 
Mr. Campbell during the course of the marriage. 
What happened to you where he physically caused 
you harm? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I did end up in the hospital 
once when I was dragged by the car. I have been physically 
thrown up against a wall, choked, thrown through doors. 
THE COURT: How were you dragged by the car? 
How did that happen? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I was trying to stop the 
car, is what I was trying to do. Because he had put my 
daughter into the car. And it was three o'clock in the 
morning, and he was drunk. And so I was extremely upset, 
because my daughter was now in the car, because she woke up 
because we were fighting. And he put her in the car. And 
I tried to stop the car. And I said, "Fine. Just take my 
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car, but I want my kid out." And he wouldn't, so I kept on 
hanging on the car. And he floored it and gunned it. And 
I couldn't hang on anymore, so ~ 
THE COURT: Which portion of the car were you 
hanging onto? 
THE WITNESS: I — the driver's side door. 
THE COURT: All right. And how far were you 
drug? 
THE WITNESS: I have no idea. I got knocked 
cold. And I woke up about Bluff Street, and he was taking 
me to the hospital. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rowe, anything you 
want to follow up in terms of evidence before you argue 
your position? I think you know where the Court stands on 
it. 
MR. ROWE: Not as far as evidence (Inaudible). 
I agree with the Court. And I would just say that any — 
you know, if there's any concern here, it's to — it's the 
probativeness versus the prejudice. 
And I would say that in addition to inadvertence 
or mistake or accident, Mr. Campbell, by characterizing 
what otherwise witnesses character as violent behavior as 
nonviolent behavior, he's interjected the basis as well for 
this testimony. 
THE COURT: All right. And I agree with you, 
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Counsel. 
Mr. Bailiff, would you return the jury back into 
the courtroom. 
Mr. Terry, in order to avoid any problems, you 
have a continuing objection to all testimony of this kind. 
MR. TERRY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had 
in open court, in the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: Thank you, Members of the Jury. The 
record will reflect that the members of the jury have 
returned, and they are all now seated in the jury box. 
Mr. Rowe, please continue. Your next question? 
MR. ROWE: Thank you. 
Q. Miss Campbell, I believe you were describing 
incidents where physical contact between you and 
Mr. Campbell had occurred. Would you complete telling the 
jury the number of times and what type of physical contact 
Mr. Campbell had with you. 
A. The number of times is pretty hard to count. It 
was often. There were several -- several that were worse 
than others. 
I have been thrown through doors. Which people 
on other occasions have seen the broken doors out on my 
patio. I still don't have the doors on my house, to this 
day. I've been dragged by the car. I have been choked. 
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Things have been broken in my house. Bookcases knocked 
over. On and on. It was constant. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. With regard to — do you know 
of Shelly and Robert McKevitt? 
A* I've never met them. 
Q. Do you know who they are? 
A. I know who they are. 
Q. And didn't you, in talking to me earlier today, 
indicate that they had removed themselves from where they 
used to live? 
A. The place of business that they had on Sunset 
has been closed. 
Q. Do you know how long that's been closed? 
A. Probably December. I'm not quite sure on that. 
MR. ROWE: I have no further questions of this 
witness. 
THE COURT: Mr. Terry, any cross? 
MR. TERRY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, ma'am. You 
may step down. 
Any other rebuttal, Mr. Rowe? 
MR. ROWE: Yes. Just briefly. Teri LaCorti. 
THE BAILIFF: Your Honor, can she be released? 
THE COURT: May this witness be excused? 
MR. ROWS: I ask that she be allowed to stay or 
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go, as she chooses. 
THE COURT: You may stay in the courtroom if you 
want, ma'am. Or you may leave. It's up to you. 
Okay. Miss LaCorti, would you come forward and 
take the witness stand again, ma'am, 
TERZ LACORTI, 
the witness herein, having been 
previously duly sworn, was examined 
further and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROWE: 
Q. Miss LaCorti, you've previously been sworn. 
Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've heard Mr. Campbell's testimony now 
regarding the events that — you heard him testifying that 
the belongings in the car were a number of different 
people's; is that correct? 
A. No, it's not. 
Q. Who did the belongings in the car belong to? 
A. Mine and his. 
Q. And you heard him say that the drugs in the car, 
he was unaware of. 
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